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The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine “the Chinese language” and all of its variant 
forms as examples of language or linguistic ideologies, a term many linguistic anthropologists 
have used to describe conceptualizations of language and their perceived social function. More 
specifically, I adopt Judith Irvine and Susan Gal’s (2000) semiotic approach to language 
ideology by examining how it is reinforced through what they call iconicity, erasure, and fractal 
recursivity. Ideologies are articulated from many different sites and are often contested with 
competing ideologies. I will discuss how these ideologies inform current debates about language 
and writing system reform as well as efforts to promote a standard national language. Ultimately, 
this paper challenges the notion of the homogeneity of a Chinese identity and of a Chinese 
language. 
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– China 
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Introduction: The Problem of ‘1 Language = 1 Culture = 1 Nation’ 
The concept of language and national identity often seems to be a rather straightforward 
one to understand. After all, English is spoken by the English in England; French is spoken by 
the French in France; and Chinese is spoken by the Chinese in China. An underlying assumption 
seems to be that these national languages allow everyone in these countries to communicate with 
each other. One of the aims of this paper is to show that thinking about languages of the world in 
such neatly defined geographical and ethnic terms is inadequate and based on ideological beliefs 
that ‘a nation’ and ‘a language’ must be connected to each other. The equation ‘1 language = 1 
culture = 1 nation’ fails to balance because it ignores much of the social complexity and 
linguistic diversity that has been and still is quite common in human societies. 
The Chinese language and how it is ideologically constructed is a very interesting case 
study to explore because of the incredible diversity of its spoken forms and because of how its 
writing system has come to represent the “essence” of Chinese culture, whatever this means. 
Many of those in frequent contact with Chinese communities are aware that the Chinese 
language consists of a variety of spoken forms commonly called “dialects” (i.e. Mandarin and 
Cantonese). Yet, many also fail to realize the problematic nature of the dialect-language 
distinction, how many dialects there really are, and how exactly the writing system functions as a 
common code consisting of “ideographs.” There are hundreds of dialects spoken in China but the 
writing system does not exactly unite all of them as a universal code. To believe that it does is to 
become a testament to the power of language ideologies. Take a look at the characters sprinkled 
on the cover page of this paper. They show seven different ways of writing ‘Chinese’ in both the 
traditional and simplified scripts. They represent multiple forms of expression and anything but a 
unified homogenous language and identity. 
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In order to show how different “dialects” of Chinese really are and how the writing 
system actually works, I present below how speakers from four different parts of China might 
say the sentence: “They are here eating Chinese food”1 in local colloquial speech. The first is a 
Mandarin speaker from the Chinese capital while the second is from Shanghai, the country’s 
largest city. The other two speak two varieties of Cantonese: one from the city of Canton and the 
second from a rural area. 
Bĕijīng: Tāmen zhèngzài zài zhèr chī zhōngguó cān.2 
Shànghăi: ila t?so?t?s? lah? g?d?? t ? ?? d?zo?guo? v?.3 
Guăngzhōu4: Kéuihdeih háidouh sihk-gán tòhng chāan. 
Kāipíng5: k?æt ?? k?œ? hæk-k?n h?? t?a:n. 
 
Whether or not readers know how to pronounce these sentences, the differences in pronunciation 
and vocabulary should be quite noticeable. Even the word for “Chinese,” which I have 
underlined, seems to be different.6 This is a point I will explore in detail later but for now, let’s 
take a look at how this sentence is written in Chinese characters: 
   他們 正在 在 這裡 吃 中國  餐。 
Mandarin: Tāmen  zhèngzài  zài  zhèlĭ     chī  zhōngguó  cān. 
Cantonese: Tāmùhn jingjoih  joih jeléuih hek jūnggwok chāan. 
 
Below the Chinese characters, I have included the reading pronunciation in both 
Mandarin and Cantonese. As can be seen, the reading pronunciations for Mandarin and 
Cantonese are more similar to each other than the colloquial equivalents. Also, the Bĕijīng 
colloquial pronunciation is almost identical to the reading pronunciation. To address how a 
unified writing system unites the Chinese language, Chinese speakers must learn a common code 
based on a form of Mandarin in order to read and write just as Medieval European scholars 
needed to learn Latin to become literate. With thousands of characters to learn, this is a very 
difficult task especially for speakers of dialects that differ significantly from Mandarin. 
Holman Tse - 4 - Senior Thesis, UCSC 
   
Consequently, literacy has historically been restricted to the educated elite and not universally 
accessible to the masses. 
For staunch supporters of nationalism and modernization, the linguistic picture of China 
is cause for concern. How can China be a great unified nation if its citizens cannot all 
communicate with each other? How can China become modernized if its rural peasantry 
continues to live in its backwards world speaking diverse incomprehensible tongues? These are 
questions that government officials have spent decades trying to address with a series of reforms 
that include simplifying the Chinese writing system to increase literacy, establishing Mandarin as 
the official language, and instituting laws and other programs to promote the development of a 
common script and common tongue. 
In this thesis, I will show how language or linguistic ideologies (Schieffelin et al 1998), a 
term many linguistic anthropologists have used to describe conceptualizations of language and 
their perceived link to various social phenomena, inform these language reform efforts. In recent 
years, many anthropologists have critiqued their predecessors’ treatment of ‘cultures’ as distinct, 
bounded, and unchanging entities. Adopting this critical approach, as have a number of linguistic 
anthropologists, I would argue that language should also be seen in a similar way. Language 
boundaries are socially constructed and there are multiple ways they can be drawn to reflect 
various ideological beliefs. I will begin by discussing key theoretical ideas important to 
understanding nationalism and how language ideology operates. This discussion will involve a 
number of examples that show that the linguistic situation in China, though unique in a number 
of ways, is not unusual. I will then show how Judith Irvine and Susan Gal’s (2000) semiotic 
approach to language ideology can apply to the Chinese case by examining what they call 
iconization, erasure, and fractal recursivity. Finally, this discussion of language ideology 
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ultimately leads to questions of identity. I will argue that language ideology plays a very 
important role in creating and challenging constantly changing notions of identity. 
 
Imagining Nation, Imagining Language: Theoretical Approaches to Understanding the 
Intersection of Language, Culture and Politics 
In his very influential book Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (1991 [1983]), Benedict Anderson examines how nationalism as a “cultural 
artefact [sic] of a particular kind (Ibid: 4)” came into historical being and how it has spread 
around the world leading the masses to develop deep emotional attachments to an entity called 
“the nation.” Central to Anderson’s argument is the emergence of what he calls “print 
capitalism” as an important ingredient in creating national consciousness. For centuries in 
Europe, as was the case for China, written language was often the exclusive domain of the 
educated elite. Following the invention of the printing press, it became easier to mass-produce 
texts not only in Latin, but also in the vernacular languages spoken by the common people. 
Anderson says that these newly published print languages allowed people who had never met 
before to communicate with each other through paper, put language in a fixed form to give it “an 
image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation,” (Ibid: 44) and created 
“languages-of-power” (Ibid: 45) by privileging particular varieties of speech. All of a sudden, as 
the masses obtained access to written texts, many began to realize, or “imagine,” that they were 
part of much larger communities. The spread of print languages, facilitated by the spread of 
capitalism, thus, sowed the seeds for the development of nationalism via the mass production and 
consumption of books and newspapers. 
Attempting to avoid Eurocentric modeling, Anderson mentions that this happened first in 
the Americas rather than in Europe. He argues that here, the descendents of European colonists 
grew increasingly distant from the Old World and increasingly connected to the local colonial 
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population by reading newspapers and other printed media. With the success of the American 
Revolution and other independence movements in Latin America, the Old World had a usable 
model to develop its own form of nationalism, which swept the European continent roughly from 
1820-1920. Later in the 20th century came the “last wave” of nationalisms, which primarily 
affected former colonies in Africa and Asia. By this time, “nation” had become such a global 
norm that it could be imagined without a single common print language and in many new ways 
(Ibid: 135).  
The fact that a common written language has been fundamental in the unification of 
China for at least 2,000 years makes Anderson’s link between written language and nationalist 
sentiments a very keen insight. Nevertheless, Anderson also seems to have some confused ideas 
about the nature of language variation. On the one hand he acknowledges the diversity of human 
tongues and describes print languages as assembling varied idiolects (Ibid: 43). This seems to 
suggest that print languages create particular languages by arbitrarily putting selected forms of 
speech together, but he states explicitly that “print language is what invents nationalism, not a 
particular language per se” (Ibid: 134, emphasis in original). Thus, he assumes that even though 
the diversity of spoken languages has always far exceeded the number of written languages, “the 
bulk of mankind [has always been] monoglot” (Ibid: 38). As I will show in a few examples, 
multilingualism was more common in pre-modern and pre-colonial settings than Anderson 
realizes. 
A number of linguistic anthropologists have critiqued Anderson’s work for his confused 
ideas about language. Michael Silverstein (2000), for example, has described Anderson’s 
conceptualization of language and national identity as classic ‘Whorfian’ thinking. According to 
Benjamin Lee Whorf, cultural conceptions are linked directly to linguistic structure. The concept 
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of time, for example, is often seen in objectified terms for speakers of what Whorf called 
Standard Average European (SAE) languages. This is characterized in English by the use of 
adjectives normally used to describe physical concrete objects such as “long,” “short”, and 
“quick” to describe time (Whorf 2001 [1956]: 370). The Hopi language, in contrast, does not 
treat time as an object and consequently its speakers do not think of time as being long, or short, 
or moving quickly. Whorf attributed this difference to SAE having tense as a grammatical 
category and Hopi lacking tense. Silverstein asserts, however, that tense does not actually refer 
to time but rather to the referential relationship of one event to another (2000: 106). Whorf also 
treats language and culture as both internally homogenous and deterministically linked together. 
Interestingly, Anderson describes a similar relationship between nationalities and languages. 
Silverstein summarizes Anderson’s concept of nationality by saying that it “is a taxonomy of 
differentiation of individuals as members of such groups, together with essentialized 
nondifferentiation of individuals within group boundaries” (2000: 111). This view of nationality, 
thus, ignores internal conflicts and treats nationalist consciousness as inherently homogenous. 
Anderson also treats the boundaries of language as if they are self-evident when, in fact, 
“contestation occurs around definitions of language as much as around community” (Gal 1998: 
325).  
Judith Irvine and Susan Gal also argue against Anderson for his ignorance of the 
dynamics of language by stating that “homogeneous language is as much imagined as is 
community” (2000: 76). The two have defined three semiotic processes actively involved in 
shaping these language ideologies that make such beliefs about language appear real. The first is 
iconization, which involves turning linguistic features or varieties into indexes of social groups 
and thus naturalizing the link between particular languages and particular social groups. The 
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second is fractal recursivity, which refers to the projecting of an opposition onto another level 
that can in turn recur at other levels. The third is erasure in which facts that challenge an 
ideology are either unnoticed or are attempted to be removed. 
Irvine and Gal illustrate these processes with examples from three different parts of the 
world. The first place is southern Africa where speakers of the Nguni languages acquired click 
sounds from the neighboring Khoi languages through the three semiotic processes they have 
described. When Nguni speakers first came in contact with Khoi speakers in pre-colonial times, 
they found Khoi click sounds rather exotic and consequently associated these sounds as icons of 
foreignness. The fractal recursivity of this involves the Nguni projecting these icons used to 
differentiate them from the Khoi to a different level of social differentiation – the hlonipha 
register, a speech style used to show respect or deference in Nguni languages. The incorporation 
of click sounds into a form of speech associated with deference created and reinforced a social 
boundary between Khoi and Nguni speakers. This boundary erased the fact that the Nguni and 
Khoi previously had close relationships with each other. 
Irvine and Gal’s second example is the language classification work of 19th century 
European linguists in Senegal. The basis of their classification system was the essentialist 
ideology that language and ethnicity are intimately linked together. Thus, “inferior” cultures 
must have “inferior” features in their languages, following this logic. The maps they created 
assumed that language, ethnic group, and territory mapped neatly onto the exact same places 
(iconization) and ignored the fact that most of the people they surveyed were multilingual and 
that many of the languages they were mapping had overlapping ranges (erasure). These linguists 
explained multilingualism and “complex” grammatical patterns found in Senegalese languages 
as borrowed features adopted through Muslim contact. This is fractal recursivity because the 
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linguists projected their hierarchical view of race onto their interpretation of why certain 
languages had complex “European” features. The original opposition of European/African 
maintained itself through a new opposition of Muslim/African and kept African languages and 
peoples in an inferior position with respect to all other languages and groups. 
Irvine and Gal’s final example is Macedonia and is especially interesting to compare to 
the Chinese case because of the contestations over nationalism involved. In the 19th century, 
Macedonia was a very multilingual region. This was seen negatively by many Western European 
visitors and officials who traveled through the region. They saw this linguistic variability as 
backwards and uncivilized. In the early 20th century during the height of nationalistic fever, 
Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian nationalists actively debated over how the language boundaries in 
the region should be drawn. Each group wanted the Macedonian languages to be part of their 
region. This involved choosing very selective linguistic features as icons of the language while 
all other linguistic data was erased. For example, Bulgarian linguists emphasized the analytic 
morphology of the Macedonian dialects and claimed that this similarity to Bulgarian made these 
languages Bulgarian. Serbian linguists emphasized the phonological similarities to Serbian and 
claimed that this was proof that these languages were Serbian. Recursivity occurred through the 
codification of literary languages and the purification of languages to reinforce distinctions 
between “our own national language” and “foreign language” (2000: 70). This example shows 
that what is defined as Serbian, Greek, or Bulgarian was a very political issue. Both national 
language and national identity were clearly invented ideas according to this example. 
It is interesting to note that the Western European travelers that visited Macedonia found 
the region barbaric and uncivilized because of the many tongues spoken. They created an 
opposition between Western and Eastern Europe and erased the fact that even in Western 
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Europe, national language was a recent invention. Eugen Weber (1976) points out that in France, 
linguistic and cultural unity did not always exist and was actually difficult to achieve. As 
recently as the late 1800’s, urban travelers who visited rural France remarked how difficult it was 
to communicate with the French peasants who did not speak French but rather a wide variety of 
unintelligible languages and dialects called patois. The existence of a unified French culture, 
French traditions, and a pure French language (icon) as envisioned by the l’Académie Française, 
are relatively recent creations of the Parisian bourgeoisie. These “civilized” urban dwellers 
projected the opposition of West/East to a new level of social differentiation in their own country 
of urban/rural. Fractal recursivity, thus, applies once again as a way of dealing with the 
perceived chaos of rural France and of reaffirming the concept of ‘nation’. Weber says: 
“If the French were (are?) as French as we have been led to believe, why so much fuss? The fact 
is, the French fuss so much about the nation because it is a living problem, became one when 
they set the nation up as an ideal, remained one because they found they could not realize the 
ideal. The more abstractly the concept of France-as-nation is presented, the less one notes 
discrepancies between theory and practice. When one gets down to facts, things become 
awkward” (1976: 112). 
 
The fact is most ‘French’ people at the end of the 19th century, especially in the south, 
had no sense of national consciousness. They lived in many different worlds that were culturally 
and linguistically distinct from the Parisian region. They had to be told they were French and 
socialized through education, government campaigns, and even military service before they 
realized they were French and before they actually started to speak French. This idea of a unified 
nation with a common language was clearly an invention of the educated urban elite. The rural 
masses did not imagine they were united until the bourgeoisie insisted that they were. 
The examples that I have just presented show how linguistic boundaries are socially and 
politically drawn. Furthermore, the three semiotic processes described by Irvine and Gal, prove 
to be powerful tools in analyzing the ideological basis of imagining language. In spite of his 
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worthwhile effort to avoid Eurocentric modeling, Anderson’s model still relies on the European 
invention of the printing press and European colonization of the Americas. Irvine and Gal have 
argued that the three semiotic processes they have presented operate worldwide and “are not 
dependent on the historical contexts of European colonialism (although they do appear 
conspicuously there)” (2000: 79). As I will show in the rest of this paper, these semiotic 
processes work very well in explaining the sociolinguistic situation in China.  
Chinese Characters as Icons of an ‘Imagined’ Identity 
With the main theoretical ideas of this paper presented, I will now return to a discussion 
of Chinese characters and the powerful language ideologies behind them. Many people, both 
Chinese and non-Chinese, would describe the Chinese writing system as embodying a very 
essential element of Chinese culture since it is one of the oldest scripts in continuous use in the 
world and has succeeded in uniting a large population with a common written code for over 
2,000 years. With such a long well-established connection with Chinese civilization, it should be 
no surprise that Chinese characters have easily become perceived as icons of an essentialized 
Chinese culture. It is worth exploring how this perception develops. 
Bob Hodge and Kam Louie (1998) argue that one of the reasons why this may be so is 
the difficulty of learning to read and write this complex written code. Even though the largest 
dictionaries contain about 50,000 characters, knowledge of 6,000 is already considered sufficient 
for a well-educated person but nevertheless, learning half this number still requires a lot of time 
and effort. Educational experts estimate that on average it takes a Mandarin-speaking child seven 
to eight years of schooling to learn to read and write 3,000 characters and an extra year or two 
for a Cantonese speaker to reach the same level of proficiency. French and Spanish school 
children, on the other hand, can reach a comparable level of reading and writing proficiency in 
their languages in half that amount of time (DeFrancis 1984: 153). Historically, very few 
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foreigners have managed to become literate in Chinese, although the numbers are increasing. 
Still, as Hodge and Louie describe, this complex writing system acts “like a dragon guarding the 
gates that lead into the Chinese mind and the texts that communicate it, dividing the world into 
two categories: those who can read characters, and ... those who can’t, who are forever outsiders, 
dependent on translators to select and give the sense of the meanings that they need” (1998: 46). 
It is this exclusionary effect that iconizes the Chinese writing system as a marker of Chinese 
identity. 
Another way that Chinese characters are involved in the production of ideology is in the 
learning of folk stories explaining the origin of various characters. With such a large number of 
characters to memorize, such stories are very helpful and essential as mnemonic aids in learning 
to read and write Chinese.7 An example of this given by Hodge and Louie is the character for 
‘good’ (好), which consists of the radical for ‘female’ (女) and the radical for ‘son’ (子). 
According to one story, ‘man’ combined the radicals for ‘female’ and ‘son’ to form the character 
for ‘good’ because it was desirable for a man to have both a wife and a child (Hodge and Louie 
1998: 56). As evident in this story, the character for ‘good’ represents the patriarchal ideals of 
Confucianism. Such stories, thus, function as more than simply tools to help the learner 
memorize individual characters. They also transmit traditional cultural ideas in the process of 
learning. To extend this analysis, the radical for ‘female’ also happens to be a component of 
many characters with negative connotations such as ‘slavery’ (奴), ‘prostitution’ (妓), ‘adultery’ 
(奸), ‘jealousy’ (妒), and ‘avarice’ (婪) (Ibid.: 60). Here, hidden in these particular characters are 
beliefs about gender and the submissive role of women in traditional Chinese society. Learning 
Chinese characters involves “in part a process of committing to memory cultural values – about 
power relationships, categorizations and social norms” (Ibid: 61). All of these cultural meanings 
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embedded in the writing system serve to reinforce the link between Chinese characters and 
Chinese identity. To learn them is to become socialized into the Chinese world of thought while 
others without the privilege to learn are excluded from this world. This, according to essentialist 
logic, makes Chinese characters icons of Chineseness because of their long history of preserving 
Chinese traditional cultural ideas. These ideals continue to be passed on to future generations of 
Chinese. 
Motivations for Language and Writing Reform: The Erasure Process 
The problem with essentialist thinking is that it ignores who is speaking and it leads to 
attempts to erase facts that do not match the ideological foundations of these beliefs. In 
discourses about Chinese writing and Chinese identity, it is often ignored that throughout much 
of Chinese history and even into the early 20th century, most Chinese people have been 
illiterate.8 Can Chinese characters even be part of an essence to Chinese culture, if most Chine
cannot even understand them? This contradiction in the belief of Chinese writing as an icon of 
Chinese culture and the reality that its difficulty prevents many Chinese from having full ac
to writing is one that informs many of the debates about Chinese language and writing reform 




As in France and much of Europe, nationalism in China was a movement that started with 
the intellectual elite and involved civilizing the rural masses, speakers of diverse unintelligible 
tongues. Consequently, most language and writing reform proposals have been put forth by 
members of this exclusive social class with the effort of improving communication within the 
country and hence increasing unity as a nation. Twentieth century Chinese history has taken 
many tumultuous twists and turns including a series of revolutions. The Mao years (1949-1976) 
brought a number of language reforms including the establishment and popularization of 
pŭtōnghuà (Mandarin) as the national standard language, the simplification of Chinese 
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characters, and the adoption and popularization of the phonetic Pīnyīn Romanization system. 
While the standardization and popularization of Mandarin seems to be moderately successful,10 
it has been far more difficult to achieve the goals of writing reform. This is partly because of the
often contradictory goals of increasing literacy and preserving Chinese culture through continued 
use of characters. 
 
The current script situation in China is a state of digraphia, defined as “one language with 
two writing systems” (Su 2000: 120). Some scholars including Peicheng Su (2000) argue that 
digraphia is perhaps the best policy because it takes advantage of the benefits of both Pīnyīn and 
characters. Advantages of Pīnyīn include ease of learning, ease of communication with the 
international community especially in the use of computers, and the promotion of a standard 
Bĕijīng pronunciation. Characters, on the other hand, are useful in helping distinguish the many 
homophones of the Chinese language but offer little else in terms of practicality. Nevertheless, 
they remain the primary system because of their continued ability to keep the Chinese state 
unified and because of strong essentialist beliefs about their importance to Chinese culture. 
Furthermore, character simplification has also made Chinese characters easier to learn and 
quicker to write but at the cost of increasing ambiguity and in introducing new characters 
unfamiliar to many overseas Chinese populations making the language incomprehensible for 
some. The ultimate goal of digraphia would be the universal use of Pīnyīn, but currently Pīnyīn 
is rarely used outside of the classroom, where it has otherwise been functioning as a very helpful 
tool in accelerating the learning of characters (Su 2000: 117-118). Thus, characters, in spite of 
their disadvantages, still serve as China’s primary writing system. Pīnyīn seems to act more as a 
transitional script to aid in full proficiency in characters than as a permanent replacement. 
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Amid all of these debates about language and writing reform, one ideological belief 
seems to underlie all of these points of view. The belief that the nation must be connected to a 
common communication system, no matter what form, remains strong. Although ideas about 
how to improve communication in China are diverse, the goal of many of these plans is to 
solidify a common Han Chinese identity and to erase all chaotic facts that challenge this 
ideology. Yet, the iconic link between the traditional character-based writing system, even with 
simplification, and a unified Chinese identity operates as a powerful hurdle against complete 
elimination of the complex writing system. 
The semiotic process of erasure is also apparent when examining what exactly is meant 
by the term ‘the Chinese language’. According to popular views among English speakers, 
‘Chinese’ is a language and forms such as Mandarin and Cantonese are ‘dialects.’ Many 
linguists, on the other hand, point out the inconsistency of such labeling given that European 
languages, which exhibit a similar range of linguistic diversity as ‘Chinese,’ are called languages 
rather than dialects. Timothy Light says that the terminology should not really matter as long as 
words are used in a consistent manner: 
“In short, if we are to call the Romance tongues ‘languages’ then we should call the Han 
tongues ‘languages’ also. Or, if we call the Han tongues ‘dialects’, then we must refer to the 
languages of France, Spain, Italy, Romania, and Roman-speaking Switzerland as Roman 
‘dialects’” (1980: 278).  
 
Whether or not linguists agree on formal definitions, language is a very political concept best 
described by a well-cited saying attributed to Max Weinreich: “A language is a dialect with an 
army.” Acknowledging the inconsistency in the usage of the words ‘dialect’ and ‘language’ 
makes it clear that many facts about ‘Chinese’ are erased in the ideological use of the term ‘the 
Chinese language’. 
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The dialect-language distinction, however, does not appear to be a serious vocabulary 
issue in the written Chinese language. As Hodge and Louie say, “the word ‘language’ itself ... is 
part of the English language referring basically to the spoken and written forms” (1998: 7-8). 
While Chinese also has a word analogous to its English counterpart that refers to both spoken 
and written language (yŭwén), it also has words used exclusively to describe oral speech (huà, 
yŭyán). The latter can be used to describe any level of differentiation and can even be used 
interchangeably with yŭwén under certain contexts. Perhaps the problem of calling Chinese a 
‘language’ and its mutually unintelligible forms ‘dialects’ is a problem of English vocabulary not 
conforming exactly to the meaning of Chinese words. This should be seen as a natural problem 
in translation but still, understanding how the Chinese use various terms for forms of speech is 
helpful in understanding the fluidity of language boundaries and the facts about Chinese 
linguistic diversity that are ideologically ignored in discourses about language and national 
identity. 
John DeFrancis proposes adopting English terminology similar to Chinese official 
terminology, which uses ‘dialect’ in both loose and strict terms. Following the 1955 Technical 
Conference on the Standardization of Modern Chinese held in Beijing, Chinese officials divided 
spoken Chinese into 8 fāngyán, which DeFrancis translates as “regional speech” and uses to coin 
the term regionalect (1984: 57). These mutually unintelligible regionalects include Mandarin, 
Wú (Shanghai), Yuè (Cantonese), Xiāng, Kèjiā (Hakka), Gàn, Southern Mĭn (Fukienese), and 
Northern Mĭn (Fukienese). Beyond the regionalects are more local and usually but not always 
mutually intelligible forms of speech referred to as dìfang-huà or dìdiăn fāngyán. This is the 
level of speech where DeFrancis sees the term ‘dialect’ as more appropriate (Ibid.). 
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Mandarin, with over 700 million speakers, is the largest and most widespread regionalect 
as well as the tongue spoken by the most number of people on earth. In spite of the wide 
geographical range of this speech community stretching from Manchuria in the northeast to 
Sìchuān and Yúnnán provinces in the southwest, most forms of Mandarin are mutually 
intelligible. The other regionalects, which are all spoken south of the Yangtze River, exhibit far 
greater diversity than Mandarin does. This extreme variation in the southeast of the country is 
partly a result of linguistic divergence caused by geographic isolation in a region of rugged 
terrain (Ramsey 1987: 23). Even geography, though, is not enough to give a complete picture of 
the linguistic diversity of Chinese. Education levels and other categories of social differentiation 
also correlate to different forms of sometimes mutually unintelligible speech even within 
particular regionalects (DeFrancis 1984: 61). An example of this is the radically different reading 
pronunciation and colloquial expression of the same idea in Cantonese that I showed in the 
introduction. To round out this picture, few Chinese are true monoglots. Code-switching and 
mixed languages are very common. The spread of Mandarin as the lingua franca makes this even 
more true with Chinese acquiring varying levels of competency in the national language while 
maintaining usage of local forms of speech in various contexts (Chen and Chen 1990). Still, few 
Chinese especially in rural areas in the south are completely fluent in two or more regionalects. 
To sum it all up, the diverse forms of spoken Chinese create a chaotic situation from a modernist 
and nationalist point of view. Yet, this should also sound very similar to the account of Early 
Modern France described by Weber and of the Macedonia and West Africa described by Irvine 
and Gal. Language and writing reform are attempts to erase the potentially divisive nature of 
these differences.  
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The Chinese Ideological Machine and Fractal Recursivity in Action 
Hodge and Louie have said that “ideology is itself never unitary or homogenous but 
operates as a complex which contains contradictions at its core” (1998: 48). They call the 
complex associated with the Chinese language “the Chinese ideological machine” because it 
“seems to operate so elegantly without external interference” and because of its amazing power 
and longevity of maintaining an idea of China all across the world (1998: 49). Acknowledgement 
of the contradictory nature of Chinese language ideology is helpful in understanding how fractal 
recursivity gives actors the resources “to create shifting ‘communities,’ identities, selves, and 
roles, at different levels of contrast, within a cultural field” (Irvine and Gal 2000: 38). Ideologies 
about Chinese involve multiple levels of dichotomies recursively produced by many different 
actors and their relationships to the Chinese state. Understanding the ideological formation of 
these dichotomies leads to a view of China as anything but a homogenous entity.  
Orient / Occident 
The very idea of linguistic boundaries conforming to ethnic boundaries is an idea tied to 
the rise of the nation-state. Anderson, as I have already discussed, has shown that this “cultural 
artefact” has spread all over the world and has been “pirated” by many different groups. The 
Chinese state has clearly accepted many of the ideas associated with nationalism as exemplified 
by the obsession of reforming the writing system and establishing a standard form of speech to 
create greater linguistic unity among its people. In order to see the fractal recursivity involved 
here, one must first examine how China is part of a much larger global dialogue that deals with 
how China and the West represent themselves and each other. These dialogues are part of 
competing discourses and ideologies that attempt to justify the superiority of one state over all 
others through the construction of dichotomies. 
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A good starting point in this discussion is Edward Said’s work on how various 19th and 
20th century European scholars, politicians, and writers have looked at the Orient as a way for the 
West to define itself against the “other.” The name he gives to this particular way of thinking that 
treats the differences between the East and West as inherently distinct is Orientalism (1978). 
According to Said, the West often sees the Orient as a homogenous, static, mysterious, and 
exotic place. This type of reasoning, he says, categorizes humanity in either “large collective 
terms or in abstract generalities” (1978: 154) and ignores the social construction of these 
categories. The construction of both the “East” and the “West” also functions as a way for the 
“West” to reaffirm its superiority over all other groups of people on earth. Said points out that 
ironically, the modern globalized economy has also led to some widespread acceptance of 
Orientalist ideas even in the Orient (1978: 325). Louise Edwards (1995) agrees pointing out how 
the Chinese are currently undergoing this process of “self-Orientalization” by accepting exotic 
myths about themselves and using them to sell literature and other forms of entertainment to the 
Western market.  
The Chinese clearly have accepted various ideas about nationality and language from the 
West, but to view this acceptance simply as blind “self-Orientalization” ignores other discourses 
in circulation and the fact that the Chinese also had their own ethnocentric ideas about the West. 
The China constructed by Orientalism, thus, “was not simply a Western invention” (Hodge and 
Louie 1998: 13). For centuries, the Chinese have had many of the same mirror images of the 
West as the West had of the Chinese. In fact, just about anyone that did not belong to the ethnic 
Han majority was considered a barbarian to the eyes of Chinese for many centuries. One of the 
Chinese names for China, Zhōngguó, literally translates as ‘Middle Kingdom’. The Chinese, 
thus, viewed themselves as the center of the civilized world and saw their complex writing 
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system as one of the many symbols of their advanced culture. Much as Orientalism helped 
Westerners define themselves, constructions of an uncivilized Western world helped the Chinese 
define themselves. 
Han / Minority 
The Han ethnic majority, which comprises a little over 91% of China’s total population 
according to the most recent statistics available (Lei 2001), is not and never was the only ethnic 
group living in China. Many non-Han indigenous groups have lived along the peripheries of the 
Chinese state for centuries and have been viewed by the dominant Han group as barbarians. 
Along with these indigenous minority groups are minority languages, which further diversify the 
overall linguistic picture of China. Much as Said has argued that the Orient was used to help 
define the Occident, China has also defined itself not only against the West but also against its 
minority groups. A study of how the state treats minority groups and their languages illustrates 
another level of fractal recursivity in Chinese language ideologies. This should sound very 
similar to the Western European perspective of Macedonia described by Irvine and Gal. 
During the Mao years, minority languages were seen as threatening to the overall unity of 
the state. The Post-Mao reforms of the 1980’s radically reversed this Cultural Revolution policy 
and gave minority groups official recognition, special economic aid, and generous political 
representation with many women holding high offices (Ibid.). Along with this official 
recognition of 55 minority groups is the promotion of use of their native languages, which 
number at least 120 (Jun 2001). The Chinese government has also actively supported efforts to 
preserve endangered languages among its minorities (Ibid.) and to develop writing systems for 
these languages (White 1992). In addition, there has also been a shift in the usage of the word 
“Chinese” to refer to national citizenship rather than to ethnic identity (Ramsey 1987: 158). 
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“Han” would, thus, be the preferred name for China’s ethnic group and “Chinese” (zhōngguórén) 
would be an inclusive term that includes the Han and all of China’s 55 minority groups. 
This recognition of linguistic diversity among minority groups seems contradictory in 
light of China’s policies of trying to unify the Han Chinese language. Yet, it is still based on the 
same language ideology that views cultural and linguistic identity as both fixed and inherently 
linked to each other. Ramsey says that although a common language was the best criterion in 
defining a minority group following the Stalinist criteria adopted in the 1950’s, the classification 
of minorities has been arbitrary and often based on selective use of ethnographic and linguistic 
data (1987: 166). For example, the Miao group of Southern China speaks several mutually 
unintelligible tongues, but all are considered part of the same ethnic group because the 
comparative linguistic data shows that their ancestors spoke a common language (Ibid.). On the 
other hand, there are also groups of people with rather fluid identities living side-by-side with the 
Han and speaking the Han Chinese language but are classified as non-Han even though they lack 
consciousness of a non-Han identity (Ibid: 167). There are also the “boat people” of mysterious 
ancestry, which include the Hoklo, the Tanka, and the Xumin, who sail around the South China 
coast. They have applied for minority status but have been rejected because they speak Chinese 
dialects (Ibid: 169). This, according to the government, makes them Han. 
However arbitrary and inconsistent minority classifications appear to be, they function as 
an ideological tool that reinforces an idea of an inherent Chinese identity formed sometime in an 
imaginary past. China’s minorities serve as something against which the Han majority can 
identify itself as Han. Thus, as was shown earlier, language was used as a way of defining 
Chineseness as something in contrast to Western identity. This dichotomous relationship recurs 
here with language once again used as a means of differentiating the Han majority from other 
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groups that live in China. The inconsistency in classification can be understood as based on an 
ideology of ethnic groups as fixed rather than as constantly in flux. It is simply a matter for 
ethnologists and linguists to decide based on collected data whether or not a group is Han. This is 
similar to the Macedonian case of linguists selecting certain features to emphasize to show the 
desired relationship of languages. Chinese officials are clearly selective about who they want to 
define as Han and who they want to define as minority. This recursivity applies to reaffirm the 
boundaries of Han identity. 
China’s current minority policies might also reflect the changing meaning of the nation-
state by incorporating a belief in “unity in diversity.” This seems to be a growing trend in nation-
state discourses. Having an ethnically diverse but unified population is increasingly seen as 
projecting a positive image of how well a country is doing. After all, “minorities happily and 
enthusiastically integrated into the life and functioning of the Chinese state are the best kind of 
advertisement for a successful and benevolent government” (Ramsey 1987: 158). 
Another place in the world where people also seem to be adopting a similar redefinition 
of nation as a diverse but united entity is in Zambia. Debra Spitulnik (1998) has studied the 
choice of languages used during radio broadcasts in this country and explores the ideologies 
involved with such choices. Zambia is home to 73 ethnic groups who speak roughly 15 to 20 
different languages, 8 of which are officially authorized to be used by mass media. Rather than 
having “democratic linguistic pluralism,” Spitulnik shows that certain languages seem to be 
privileged over others such that there is “hierarchical linguistic pluralism” (1998:169). This 
seems to be a contradiction in the state’s overall goal of “unity in diversity” because the diverse 
groups of Zambia are not all treated equally. She coins the term culturalization of ethnicity to 
describe this particular belief about “diversity” that she sees developing in these airwave 
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discourses that seems to have produced contradictory results (1998: 167). Citing Patricia Spyer, 
she sees this belief as “a compartmentalization and ‘codification of diversity [in which] all 
diversities become exchangeable’” (1998: 184). Put in other words, this belief acknowledges that 
there are many different but distinct ethnic groups and that each ethnic group has its own unique 
traditions, dances, songs, and in short “culture.” National identity is defined in terms of a 
philosophy of ethnic pluralism but this pluralism is strictly defined in these compartmentalized 
terms that are seen as all being equal but at the same time also fixed and essentialized. Spitulnik 
adds, though, that in reality most of Zambia’s population is multiethnic and multilingual (1998: 
183) but somehow the dominant ideology still treats people’s language and ethnicity as falling 
into neat categories. 
As Silverstein would describe, this is very ‘Whorfian’ logic. This discussion should also 
sound similar to how the Chinese state currently views ethnicity and diversity within its borders. 
The state sees recognizing minority groups as producing positive images of the state because 
they show that the state can unite in spite of differences. Yet, in defining diversity, both China 
and Zimbabwe rely on defining fixed ethnic and linguistic groups. This definition erases facts 
about the fluidity of identity and language in both countries. In the Chinese case, this is an 
example of fractal recursivity involving the projection of the East/West dichotomy to the level of 
Han/Minority to explain differences between the Han majority and minority groups. 
Guóyŭ /Pŭtōnghuà: Taiwanese Contestations of Chineseness 
The final examples of fractal recursivity that I will show involve defining regional 
identity as Han Chinese people. They should sound similar to Weber’s account of the dichotomy 
of urban/rural in late 19th century France. Though the Han Chinese group is arguably the largest 
ethnic group on earth, a unified Han identity is also an actively contested idea. What emerges 
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from the following accounts is a variety of responses from both Taiwanese and Cantonese-
speaking Chinese. Here, it can clearly be seen that these regional responses to dominant Chinese 
state linguistic ideologies show how recursively created oppositions provide the resources to 
create shifting identities as described by Irvine and Gal. 
One way to understand the oppositions involved here is the use of different terms to 
describe the Chinese language. As a first example, Guóyŭ means “national language” and it was 
designed to serve exactly that purpose during the Republican era of Chinese history roughly from 
1912-1949. Following the 1949 Communist Revolution, many pro-nationalist supporters fled to 
the island of Taiwan, which then became the Republic of China (ROC). In 1955, Pŭtōnghuà 
(“common speech”) was declared the name of the official language of Communist China. 
Interestingly, both Guóyŭ and Pŭtōnghuà have “been defined in such a way that it is difficult to 
see how [they] actually” differ from each other (Norman 1988: 137). Both are based on a form of 
Mandarin spoken in Bĕijīng. While Pŭtōnghuà is now the normal word for ‘Mandarin’ in 
mainland China, the Taiwanese have stuck with the word Guóyŭ to refer to their national 
language. 
As a result of differing nationalist ideologies that continue to this day, many Taiwanese 
have been developing a stronger sense of a national identity. Language still continues to serve as 
a medium of creating oppositions with the mainland Chinese government. Besides different 
names for Mandarin, different romanization systems and scripts are used in Taiwan. Until 1999, 
the ROC insisted on using the Wade-Giles romanization system created in 1912, instead of 
adopting Pīnyīn (Su 2001: 123). Taiwan also continues to use traditional Chinese characters 
without even considering the idea of script reform and character simplification. In fact, until the 
early 1990’s, the ROC banned the importation of all materials printed in simplified characters as 
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an act of opposition against the mainland Chinese government (Rohsenow 2001: 130). Once 
again, we see an ideology essentializing the link between language and Chineseness or the 
iconization discussed by Irvine and Gal. Yet, this ideology is not viewed in the same way. For 
many Taiwanese, a Taiwanese identity is characterized as one that aims to preserve “traditional 
Chinese culture” and Chinese language (Ibid). Preserving the traditional script and resisting 
measures that reinforce the commonalities between Mainland and Taiwanese Mandarin such as 
not using the Pīnyīn system can be seen as means to create a distinct Taiwanese identity that 
identifies itself against mainland Chinese. For government officials on the mainland, modernity 
and a common code of communication in any form are more important than preserving a 
traditional written language that has failed to reach the masses. Both Taiwan and China are 
operating on an ideology connecting language with identity but each one sees Chineseness in 
different terms. This is an example of the complex, contradictory results of the Chinese 
Ideological Machine described by Hodge and Louie. This example also supports Irvine and Gal’s 
insight about how fractal recursivity gives the resources to create shifting identities. 
Chineseness, then, takes multiple meanings. 
To further complicate the picture of Taiwanese identity, the composition of the island 
consists of 13% Mandarin-speaking Chinese mainlanders (on the island since the Communist 
Revolution), 12% Hakka, 1.8% Austronesian Aborigines and an overwhelming 73.2% native 
Taiwanese who are descendents of Fukienese-speaking Chinese settlers that have inhabited the 
island since the 1640’s (Huang 2000:144). A whole other range of language and identity issues 
arises from conflicts among these diverse groups but a discussion of this is beyond the scope of 
this paper. I will say, however, that this leads to other examples of fractal recursivity. 
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Tòhngyàhn/Zhōnguórén: Cantonese Contestations of Chineseness 
Going back to the introduction of this essay, I presented four different ways of expressing 
the same idea in four different forms of colloquial Chinese speech and mentioned that they even 
differ in the word they use for “Chinese.” The Bĕijīng form (zhōngguó) can be used and 
understood throughout much of the Chinese-speaking world but the Cantonese form is used 
almost exclusively among Cantonese speakers. The word tòhng (Mandarin: táng) refers to the 
Tang Dynasty (618-906 AD) and reflects the migration of Chinese from the North to inhabit the 
area that is now Guăngdōng Province during this period (Chun 1996: 112). For Cantonese 
speakers, tòhng is a colloquial adjective used to describe anything Chinese. Examples of this 
include tòhngsāan (‘Tang Mountain’), which many overseas Chinese use to refer to their 
homeland, and tòhngwá, which broadly means ‘Chinese language’ without reference to any 
particular form of the language. These words are part of the everyday speech of many Cantonese 
speakers but neither of these terms translated literally into Mandarin carry the meaning ‘China’ 
or ‘Chinese’. They simply mean ‘Tang Mountain’ and ‘Tang language’ in Mandarin.  
The wide use of the word tòhng reflects a strong sense of regional identity in Guăngdōng. 
In fact, the Cantonese-speaking part of China has shown some of the strongest resistance to 
adopting Mandarin. Some reasons explaining why Mandarin has not been as widely adopted in 
this region include the difficulty of learning Mandarin for these speakers because of major 
linguistic differences between the two regionalects, lack of access to education, and a historical 
association of Pŭtōnghuà with wartime northerners and backwardness (Pan 2000: 23-24). 
Furthermore, the Cantonese-speaking south has also been much more economically prosperous 
than the north and so consequently Cantonese has developed high prestige as the southern 
Chinese lingua franca as well as in many overseas Chinese communities. Cantonese speakers 
have no urgent need to learn Mandarin because their language already has a special social status 
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in the south. In spite of this resistance, the number of Mandarin speakers in the south is gradually 
increasing. Nevertheless, local perceptions about language prestige pose serious challenges to 
official state discourses. 
With Cantonese, it is interesting to think back to what Anderson said about vernacular 
writing and national consciousness because Cantonese as well as several other regionalects do 
have vernacular writing associated with them that differs from the national norm. These 
vernacular characters, however, have never had wide use and have been viewed negatively even 
among speakers of these forms of speech. Even in Hong Kong where over 90% of the population 
speaks Cantonese, dialect writing is considered low class and uneducated (Chen 1999: 117). The 
use of dialect writing and romanization systems based on regionalects would probably be a very 
efficient way of increasing literacy because these forms of writing are closer to actual forms of 
speech (Ibid: 119). Government officials, however, have vehemently rejected such plans because 
they have the potential to lead to the disunity of the state and the further development of a 
regional southern Chinese identity (Ibid). Ping Chen speculates that the adoption of regional 
writing systems could cause the Chinese languages to follow the fate of Latin when vernacular 
languages became printed on paper (1996: 239). This is a scenario very reminiscent of Anderson 
and is a road that government officials do not want to risk taking. This reluctance to adopt 
writing systems that could help tremendously in increasing literacy shows the value the state sees 
in maintaining a unified Chinese language and identity. This is a linguistic ideology that remains 
strong, though not unopposed. 
Language Not a ‘Fact’ But a ‘Production’: A Conclusion 
To conclude this paper, it would be refreshing to think about the words of Stuart Hall 
when he says that “identity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Perhaps instead of 
thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact ... we should think, instead, of identity as a 
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‘production’, which is never complete” (1990: 222). This can apply to language and linguistic 
identity too. I have shown in this paper that language boundaries are not self-evident; they are 
often politically defined. Language is, thus, not an accomplished fact, but something that is 
constantly in the process of being defined. Debates about language and national identity show 
that language continues to be a contested concept because it is seen as having such a close 
relationship to national identity. The semiotic processes described by Irvine and Gal clearly show 
how language ideology is used to maintain perceptions of a unified China, which in reality is 
both culturally and linguistically diverse in spite of how languages are identified. I have argued 
that China and the Chinese language are anything, but homogenous as often depicted in Western 
popular and official state discourses. These perceptions of homogeneity underscore the power of 
language ideologies in creating and recreating socially produced ideas about how to make sense 
of the natural Babel of human linguistic diversity. 
                                                 
Note: Unless otherwise stated, Chinese terms are in the Pīnyīn Romanization system. Cantonese 




1 This sentence is my own creation chosen to demonstrate as much contrast as I was able to think of among the 
selected forms of Chinese. Both the Guăngzhōu and Kāiping forms are based on my own native-speaker intuition 
and sound like normal utterances from a Chinese-American perspective. The Bĕijīng and Shànghăi forms, on the 
other hand, might sound a little unusual and verbose to native speakers because of the use of the word “Chinese” to 
describe the meal and the emphasis on the event as an action taking place at this minute. But this is intentional and 
underscores the fact that the Chinese ‘dialects’ differ in more than just phonology but also in the connotations 
conveyed with the use of various words and in syntax. The concept of a Chinese ethnic or national cuisine has not 
been as well solidified in Northern China as well as it has in the South. Also, Cantonese has a progressive aspect 
marker (-gán / -k ?n, in Kāipíng) similar to the English (-ing) that makes this sentence an event that is 
unambiguously taking place at this moment rather than a habitual event. Both Mandarin and Shanghainese lack this 
grammatical morpheme and require the use of an adverb such as zhèngzài to indicate an event that is unambiguously 
taking place at this moment.  
2 I would like to thank Conny Tse for her fluent knowledge of Mandarin. 
3 I would like to thank my informant Lynn Lin, a fellow UCSC student, for her knowledge of Shanghainese. I have 
transcribed her speech using the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) without tone markings. 
4 This is the pīnyīn spelling of the city of Canton. The sentence here is romanized according to the Yale System. 
5 One of the Siyi counties, the ancestral home of most Chinese-Americans, located about 90km/56 miles southwest 
of Guăngzhōu. I have transcribed this sentence in IPA without tone markings. 
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6 Many words in standard Cantonese beginning with a <t> correspond to words beginning with <h> in the Siyi 
dialects. So the words used here for “Chinese” in Guăngzhōu and Kāipíng are actually cognates that are different 
from the words used in the other two dialects. 
7 DeFrancis (1984) points out that the phonetic element present in a majority of characters is often ignored. The 
characters I present here are purely ideographic, but it is worth noting that phonetic clues, if present in a particular 
character, provide another valuable mnemonic aid in learning characters. 
8 ‘Literacy’ has not been a clearly defined term. DeFrancis (1984) is skeptical about official government statistics on 
literacy because they are often inconsistent about how many characters one needs to know to be considered literate. 
Furthermore, gathering accurate data in rural areas, where illiteracy rates are likely to be the highest, is very 
difficult. 
9 According to a conservative estimate reported by Ping Chen (1994: 367), about 2,000 different schemes to reform 
the writing system have been introduced since 1892. This has clearly been a rather heated issue connected to the rise 
of nationalism. 
10 This is especially true in urban areas, the places in China where foreigners are most likely to visit. 
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